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The Florida Supreme Court decided about one hundred cases during the
period reported from January 22, 1954, through March 23, 1954. Those opin-
ions (excluding memorandum decisions and a few others not considered of
sufficient importance to be noted here) found in 70 So.2d 290 to 71 So.2d
751 are herewith reported. In addition, two federal cases interpretive of
Florida law are included. These were found from 209 F.2d 1 to-210 F.2d
652 (advanced sheets from January 5, 1954, through March 5, 1954); and
115 F. Supp. 386 to 117 F. Supp. 870 (Advanced sheets from October 23,
1953, through January 14, 1954).
APPEAL AND ERROR. A failure to bring the transcript of record of the
first suit, upon which a finding of res judicata was based, was sufficient
justification for a finding by the Supreme Court that the order dismissing
the complaint was correct.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE. Continuance. Defendant had "noticed" the case
for trial. When the case was called for trial, plaintiffs filed a written motion
for a continuance, setting forth that arrangements had been made to take
the deposition of a plaintiff in Mississippi, which deposition had not yet
been received. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to
grant the continuance did not constitute failure to exercise sound judicial
discretion.'
Summary Judgments. It was not error for the court to grant a summary
final judgment to the defendant in a suit where the plaintiff had moved for
such a judgment, in the absence of timely and meritorious objection, there
being no issue as to any material fact. The facts, as properly construed
against the defendant, showed that the defendant was entitled to such
judgment as a matter of law, despite the fact that he had not moved for it,,
although it may be better practice to file a cross complaint.4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Double jeopardy. An information was filed
charging defendant with embezzlement of county funds during the month of
September, 1952. A demurrer to defendant's plea of double jeopardy, there
having been an acquittal under a prior information charging embezzlement
during several months, including September, 1952, was sustained. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the prior
acquittal was a bar to the instant prosecution under the constitutional
*This issue of the Quarterly Snyopsis was written by Jerry Mosca and edited by
George R. Georgieff.
1. Cohen v. Cohen, 70 So.2d 362 (F . 1954).
2. Rainey v. Roesall Corp., 71 So.2d 160 (FL. 1954).
3. FLA. STAT. 30 Common Law Rules, Rule 43.
4. Carpinetta v. Shields, 70 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1954).
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guaranty' against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same criminal of-
fense. '
CONTRACTS. Specific performance. In an action for specific performance
to convey land, the vendor can not take advantage of a delay in perfor-
mance by the purchaser which he condoned. The failure of the purchaser to
complete the contract within thirty days did not preclude him from requiring
specific performance by the vendor where there was no definite time set for
the closing.'
CRIMINAL LAW. Evidence: Photographs. The admission of photographs
in a murder prosecution was not error where a material issue was involved.,
Pardon: Recommitment. An order recommitting a prisoner on a conditional
pardon, for breach of the condition, was proper notwithstanding the fact
that the period of the original sentence had expired when the conditional
pardon was revoked.'
Statutes: Punishment clauses. In a habeas corpus proceeding the petition-
er was not granted the writ and was remanded to custody, the denial being
based upon a special act"a of the Legislature. On appeal, it was held that
since the act" failed to state any offense punishable under the laws, its
own punishment clause being unconstitutional,"1 the statute"1 providing for
the punishment of misdemeanors when punishment was not otherwise pro-
vided for, was inapplicable."4
DAMAGES. Wrongful death. A widow sued in two counts, individually and
as administratrix, for the wrongful death of her husband resulting from an
automobile injury. The court's instructions, which did not make it clear
that if the jury allowed loss of prospective estate of the deceased on one
count they could not allow it on the other, constituted reversible error."
DIVORCE. Alimony: Modification. In an original final decree of divorce,
a wife had relinquished her right to alimony in consideration of a property
division and lump sum awards. She could not later be awarded alimony
under a statute" providing for modification of alimony awards."
Alimony Decree: Modification. Although the Supreme Court is reluctant
to modify final alimony decrees, it will do so in order to preserve husband's
standard of living and earning capacity as a dentist.a
Custody of minor children. In a suit for separate maintenance, wherein
the ultimate issue was whether maternal or paternal grandparents should
rear the child, the 'child was properly left with paternal grandparents with
5. FLA. CONST. Declaration ot Rights, §§ 11, 12.
6. Bizzell v. State, 71 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1954).
7. Forbes v. Babel, 70 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1954).
8. Henderson v. State, 70 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1954).
9. Beal v. Mayo, 70 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1954).
10. Acts of Fla., c. 29532 (1953).
I1. Ibid.'
12. id. § 2.
13. FLA. STAT. § 775.07 (1951).
14. Taulty v. Hobby, Sheriff, 71 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1954).
15. Dobbs v. Griffith, 70 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1954).
16. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1951).
17. Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1954).
18. Evans v. Evans, 70 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1954).
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whom he had resided for the two years prior to the suit. During such time,
the child's mental and physical health improved vastly, while there was an
absence of evidence showing better conditions at the home of the maternal
grandparents in Texas."9
Final Decree: Modification. A final decree adverse to a divorced husband
was set aside to allow the husband to show that a foreign divorce decree
providing for alimony and child support permitted modification of the foreign
decree as to accrued payments. The Supreme Court held that the final decree
was properly re-entered when the husband did not produce such evidence
within a reasonable time."'
ELECTIONS. Statutory requirements. In a proceeding for a writ of man-
damus which required the Supervisor of Registration to certify a relator's
election as Justice of the Peace, the Supreme Court, reversing the Circuit
Court for Highlands County, held that the statute3 ' abolishing justice dis-
tricts in Highlands County, subject to a majority vote of electors voting in
such county at the next general election, required approval only by a major-
ity of the electors voting on the proposition submitted in the special elec-
tion at the time and place of such.general election."
EQUITY. Injunction. In a situation where a statute 3 required discontin-
uance of telephone service on the premises where service was used for
gambling purposes, equity had no power to grant injunctive relief to the
owner of the premises, regardless of the owner's knowledge of such illegal
use. The owner's only relief lay through reinstatement powers of the Rail-
road and Public Utilities Commission. The court did not, however, lose its
jurisdiction to proceed to a final disposition of the suit by the fact that ser-
vice was actually discontinued during pendency of the suit. In the event
that a showing of special equities is made, equity may consider whether
conditions exist under which the statutory penalty attaches. 4
FLORIDA. Constitution. A provision of the Florida Constitution disal-
lows any senator or member of the House of Representatives from being
elected to any office that has been created, or the emoluments whereof have
been increased, during said legislator's incumbency. However, where such
constitutional provision would bar a candidate whose candidacy is obvious-
ly not motivated by such increase in the emoluments of the office, and
where such increase was limited to the benefit of the incumbent, the pro-
vision would be given a reasonable construction in light of the purpose of
its enactment.
2 '
County Civil Service: Deputy Sheriffs. Deputy sheriffs are "officers,"
not "employees," therefore a provision of the Hillsborough County Civil
19. Zdanowicz v. Zadanowicz, 70 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1954).
20. Wolk v. Leak, 70 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1954).
21. Sp. Acts 1951 c. 27592, FLA. CONST. Art. 5, §21.
22. Droit v. State ex Tel Long, 71 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1954).
23. FLA. STAT. §§ 365.01 et seq., 365.08 (1953).
24. Peters v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 70 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1954).
25. FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 5.
26. State ex rel West v. Gray, 70 So-2d 471 (Fla. 1954)
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Service Law" providing that deputy sheriffs are "employees" within class-
ified service provisions of the act is unconstitutional."
Medical Schools: State subsidies. Citizens and taxpayers, as intervenors,
appealed from a declaratory decree of the Circuit Court for Leon County
directing the Board of Control to pay to the University of Miami a subsidy
authorized by statute29 in re "the first credited medical school in the
state." The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' contention that the
Chancellor's acceptance of testimony of sponsors of the University amount-
ed to judicial legislation, and upheld the decree. In citing a previous de-
cision,'0 the court stated that the purpose of the statute', was to encourage
the establishment of a medical school in Florida, such purpose being clear-
ly manifested by further appropriations subsequent to the subsidy herein
discussed."1
State Bond Issue: Pledge of general credit, In a proceeding for validation
of proposed revenue bonds, which were to be issued by a state agency to
finance construction of a bridge system, the Circuit Court for Dade County
entered a decree validating the bonds. The state appealed, on grounds that
covenants" by the State Road Department represented'a pledge of general
credit, therefore rendering the proposed bond issue unconstitutional." The
Supreme Court held that the covenants did not represent a pledge of general
credit, and therefore did not require the bond issue, which was payable
solely from certain gasoline tax funds, to be presented to freeholders for
their approval."
State Racing Commission: Scholarship Racing Days. After holding that
§ § 550.03 and 550.08, F.S., are not violative of the Florida Constitution,"
the Supreme Court held that extra scholarship racing days must be awarded
either before or after the regular 120-day racing season, and can not be al-
lowed within such 120-day season."
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. Similar names. A Florida corporation
brought an action to enjoin an Illinois corporation from doing business in
27. S p. Acts 1951 c. 27601, §§ 1 ef seq.. 18, 23; FLA. STAT. § 30.07, (1953);FLA. CONST.Aft. ill, §§ 20, 27; Art. IV § 15;Art. XVI,§ 4.
28. Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1954).
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 242.62, 242.63 (1953). -
30. Overman v, Board of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Ela. 1954).
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 242.62, 242.63 (1953).
32. Overman v. State Board of Control, 71 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1954).33. The Board of County Commissioners of Broward County authorized and re-
quested the Improvement Commission to enter a lease-purchase areement whereby
title to the bridge system would be taken by the commission, which would in turn
lease the system to the State Road Department. The covenants in question resulted
in the lease-purchase agreement, the State Road Department covenanting to pay,
from other sources than the Broward County Gasoline Tax funds, all coats of cur-rent operation, repairs and maintenance, as well as agreeing to complete construc-
tion of the bridges if the monies deposited in the "System Construction Fund"
should prove inadequate.
34. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 6.
35. State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, 71 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1954).
36. FLA. CONST Art. IX, H§ 2, 4; Art. Ill, § 30.
37. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n Inc. v. Florida State Racing Commission, 70
So.2d 375 (Fla. 1954).
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Florida because of a similarity in names. The Illinois corporation was al-
lowed to do business provided the qualifying words "of Illinois" were ad-
ded to its name."
INSURANCE. Personal injury: Recovery'. Under a policy having a bodily
injury coverage of $5,000.00 for each person insured, the insurer was liable
for $5,000.00 each to husband and wife but was not liable to them for
$10,000.00 jointly. Hence, an award to the husband of $5,000.00 and an
award to the wife of $2,000.00 precluded the husband from recovering the
$3,000.00 remaining after payment of the wife's claim."
JONES ACT. Limitation of Actions: Effect of State Law. The District
Court dismissed a suit wherein the plaintiffs brought an action for the
death of a seaman under the Jones Act. A failure of the plaintiffs to file
notices of claim as required by the Florida nonclaim statute40 constituted
the grounds for dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, de-
claring that the three year limitation period under the Jones Act is a sub-
stantive right and therefore can not be impaired by the Florida statute,"1
which requires the filing of a claim within eight months."
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Municital Corporations. A city charter pro-
vision for notice within sixty days after receipt of injury, applicable to
tort actions, did not govern where the plaintiff's action for an overdose of
X-ray treatment was based upon contract. The Statute of Limitations" did
not begin to run until the plaintiff was first put on notice of the injury."
Statutory Liability. An action was brought under the federal anti-trust
laws. The court held that the Florida statute of limitations" requiring any
action on a liability created by statute, other than a penalty of forfeiture,
must be brought within three years was applicable. The Florida statute of
limitations"° providing that any action for relief not specifically provided
for must be brought within four years, was inapplicable.
MORTGAGES. Usury. The holder of a mortgage who had demanded a bon-
us exercised his right under an acceleration clause. The rate of interest
plus the bonus, amortized over the period the loan remained in existence,
amounted to a sum in excess of the legal rate, and was therefore usur-
ious." The evidence sustained the master's finding that the mortgagee
wilfully and knowingly demanded the excess rate."
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Zoning ordinance: judicial interpretation.
In a suit to restrain the city from enforcing a zoning ordinance which limit-
38. United Life Insurance Co. v. United Insurance Co., 70 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1954).
39. Trombley v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., 70 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1954).
40. FL A. STAT. § 733.16 (1) (1953).
41. ibid.
42. Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76 (5th Cit. 1954).
43. FLA. STAT. § 95.24 (1953).
44. City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
45. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (5) (a) (1953).
46. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (4) (1953).
47. Crummer Co. v. DuPont, 117 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
48. FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1953)-
49. Sonz v. Eisenstat. 70 So.2d 371 (Fla. 19i4).
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ed the use of oceanside properties to single family residences, the Circuit
Court for Dade County entered a judgment from which the city appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision on grounds that although the duty
of the courts to maintain the Constitution applies, when properly invoked,
against a zoning ordinance as well as against the Legislature, where the
zoning question was '"fairly debatable"- the court could not substitute its
judgment for that of the zoning body.3'
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS. Modification of Findings. The Rail-
road and Public Utilities Commission has been granted powers to inflict
penalties for inadequacy of equipment, repairs and improvements, as well
as rate making powers, by the Legislature." However, a finding by the
Commission that an increase in rate was just and reasonable can not be
modified, in the same proceeding, by inflicting a penalty for poor or in-
adequate service."3
REAL PROPERTY. Accretion. Lots, which were bounded by a dedicated
street on one side and by the ocean on the other side, disappeared be-
neath the surface. 'Tie Supreme Court held that the owner had no claim to
an irregular strip which was built up by accretion on the farther side of the
street. 4
i3roker's commissions: Attorney's lees. Plaintiffs purchased real estate
from defendants which included a home and a going business. Alleging
fraud and misrepresentation, plaintiffs brought suit to rescind the contract
after occupying the premises for two weeks. Defendants sought recovery of
the balance of the purchase price and for broker's commissions and at-
torney's fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Cir-
cuit Court that the defendant-vendors were entitled to broker's conunissions
and attorney's fees, there being no contract, statute, or other basis for the
allowance of such fees.-
Contract for Deed. A husband assigned contracts for a deed to his wife,
but procured a deed from the vendor to himself. He was estopped from deny-
ing the validity of his wife's conveyance to third parties where he had no
knowledge of the conveyance. by procuring the deed to himself, he became
the trustee of a constructive trust which equity would execute, thereby
making good his wife's conveyance to her grantees.16
Deeds: Possibility of Reverter. Grantees brought suit to quiet title
against a possibility of reverter under a statute" cancelling all reverter
provisions in plats or deeds conveying any interest in real estate which
has been in effect for more than twenty-one years. Despite the "sayer"
50. "An ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any reason it is
open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical
deduction that in no way involve its constitutional validity."
51. City of Miami Beach v. Lachnan, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1954).
52. FLA. STAT. § 364.03, 364.14, 364.15, 364.21, 364.33 et seq. (1953).
53. Florida Telephone Corporation v. Carter, 70 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1954).
54. Earle v. McCarty, 70 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1954).
55. Thornwaite v. Thomas, 71 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1954).
56. Omwake v. Omwake, 70 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1954).
57. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1953).
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clause in the statute" allowing holders of such possibility of reverter one
year from the date of the act to enforce their rights, the Supreme Court de-
clared the statute unconstitutional since it impaired contractual obliga-
tions" in effect for more than twenty-one years, contrary to decisions"' of
the Supreme Court of the United States."
TAXATION. Homestead. A homestead owner brought suit to enjoin the
imposition and collection of a city ad valorem tax which had been imposed
on all property, real and personal, to produce revenues to defray garbage,
waste, and trash collection expense. The Supreme Court, affirming the de-
cision of the Circuit Court for Broward County, stated that the tax was vio-
lative of the constitutional provision"' exempting homestead property from
all taxation except for assessments for special benefits up to an assessed
value of $5,000.00.
6
TORTS. Contributory Negligence. In a suit where there is no genuine is-
sue as to any material fact with reference to the question of contributory
negligence, such question should not be submitted to the jury. Submission
to the jury of a question of contributory negligence when such question is
not supported by evidence is error, tending to confuse and mislead the
jury.-
TRIAL. Directed Verdict: Opening statement. A suit was brought under
the automobile guest statute" to recover for injuries. The Circuit Court for
Dade County granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the plaintiff's
opening statement to the jury, "entirely on the ground that the facts of the
opening statement, if proved, would not be sufficient for a jury verdict.... "
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss, since an opening statement is nothing more than the plaintiff's
theory of the case and what he proposes to prove, although he may later
prove matters not embraced in the opening statement. An opening statement,
therefore, is no basis on which to grant a directed verdict. 6
WiLLS. A joint will was executed by a husband and wife providing that
the survivor should succeed to the entire real estate of the spouse first
dying, and that any residue after the survivor's death should be divided
equally among three others. In such a case, the surviving wife was vested
with broad powers and liberal discretion in conveying a fee simple title to
realty devised by the will."
HOMESTEAD. A wife, who was sole owner of a home in which she and
58. [bid, § 7.
59. The covenants in question were placed in the deeds for the benefit of the
parties, and the reverter covenant set outmeans of enforcement.
60. Sturgess v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat 122 (U.S. 18i9); Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
61. Biltmorc Village, Inc. v. Royal Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Rotolnte, 71 So.2d
727 (FIa. 1954).
62. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 7.
63. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Carter, 71 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1954).
64. Rogers- v. Orlando Transit Co., 70 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1954).
65. FLA. S rAT. '5 320.59 (1953).
66. Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1954).
67. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 70 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1954).
her dependent husband lived, and who was survived by her dependent hus-
band and adult children who did not live in the home, could not devise the
home by will," there being no minor children. Since the husband was de-
pendent upon the wife for support, the wife was the "head of household.""
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Employee: Definition. A claimant who had
operated a business for six years prior to incorporation, and who, after in-
corporation, was a director, president and general manager, and could not
be fired, was not, within the meaning of the workmen's compensation sta-
tute,", and employee."
Liability: Intervening Decision. A claimant, seeking workmen's compen-
sation, filed a petition for modification after the Industrial Commission had
denied compensation. the commission thereupon treated the petition as a
new claim and granted compensation under authority of an intervening Su-
preme Court decision. The Supreme Court held that since the time for ap-
peal from the original decision had expired, that decision was res judicata.
Therefore, even though the intervening decision of the Supreme Court may
have changed the liability of rule of law, it is not sufficient ground for the
filing of a new claim under the same facts."
Limitation of actions. An employee's claim for additional compensation
was not barred by a one-year limitation period prescribed by statute" where
an additional claim was not made on the ground of a change in condition or
mistake in the determination of a material fact at the time of the original
award. The full Industrial Commission never having finally determined that
the carrier had discharged its obligation to the claimant in full prior to the
time of the employee's claim for additional compensation, the matter remain-
ed open for adjudication despite the lapse of one year from the date of the
last compensation payment and the date the employee filed his petition for
additional compensation."
Subsequent benefit increases. Acceptance of workmen's compensation
statutes by the employer, employee, and carrier constitutes a contract gov-
erned by the statutes as they existed at the time of the injury, even though
benefits accruing to the claimant were increased by amendment to the sta-
tute 5 before the insured's death, but after the injury."6
68. See FLA. CONST., Art. X, § 4.
69. Stephens v. Campbell, 70 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1954).
70. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (2) (1953).
71. Ben-Jay Food Distributors, Inc., v. Warshaw, 70"So.2d 564 (Fla. 1954).
72. Plymouth Citrus lroducts Co-op v. Williamson, 71 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1954).
73. FLA. STAT., § 440.28 (1953).
74. Superior Iiomebuilders v. Moss, 70 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1954).
75. FLA. STAT., § 440.16 (1953).
76. llecht v. Parkinson, 70 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1954)-
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